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I
In their book Causation in the Law,' H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honor6
distinguish between the explanatory and attributive contexts in which causal
questions typically arise. This distinction is important to Hart and Honor6
partly because of their belief that causal inquiry in the law is generally
attributive. 2 Perhaps what they have in mind in making this distinction is
more accurately characterized as two kinds of causal inquiry, or two kinds of
causal judgment, or even two kinds of causal connection. In any event, the
distinction between the explanatory and the attributive as it applies to causal
judgments seems remarkably elusive, and its importance, whether for the law,
history, or common sense is correspondingly obscure. Section two of this
article is a brief discussion of the main lines of Hart and Honor6's account of
the principles underlying the common sense notion of a cause. Section three
is a critical examination of their distinction between the explanatory and
attributive contexts of causal inquiry. The extent to which value judgments
enter into causal selection is discussed in section four. The relation of
attributions of responsibility to causal selection is discussed in section five.
Section six concludes the article with a discussion of the suggestion that
attributive causal inquiry may be distinguished by its focus on consequences.
II
Hart and Honor6 offer an analysis of causal judgment in everyday life,
history, and the law that has greatly influenced subsequent philosophical
discussion of causal thinking.3 Their main concern is with a particular aspect
of the way causes are talked about in these fields. When investigating some
occurrence, it is common to distinguish between earlier events, conditions,
and actions that can be singled out as the cause or causes of what happened,
and those that, although relevant to the occurrence, are nevertheless seen as
no more than part of the situation or circumstances, the background within
which the truly causal conditions did their work. This distinction was scarcely
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noticed by philosophers before John Stuart Mill4 in the mid-nineteenth
century, and was hardly treated as an interesting philosophical problem
before R.G. Collingwood 5 discussed it in the 1930's. Hart and Honor
contrast causes with "mere" conditions. This contrast is important because
differences in causal diagnosis are often traceable to disagreements about
which relevant conditions should be singled out as genuine causes of an
occurrence rather than to disagreements about which conditions were
relevant to the occurrence.
Hart and Honor6's persuasive account of the principles underlying this
contrast begins with the general, common sense notion of a cause. Both
lawyers and historians, they point out, show considerable respect for common
sense ways of thinking about the natural world and human affairs. 6 For
common sense, the most general and pervasive notion of a cause is that of
something which intrudes into a settled state of affairs or which interferes with
ongoing processes. They claim to find two more specific principles employed
in the selection of causes. 7 The first is to select as causes highly abnormal
antecedent conditions over equally relevant but normal ones. For example, in
an area where hurricanes are unprecedented, if one unexpectedly arrives, it is
the hurricane itself that will be considered the cause of the ensuing damage,
not the unsurprising fact that those living in the area failed to hurricane-proof
their houses. By contrast, if the same damage occurs in an area where
hurricanes are common, it is not the hurricane but the inhabitants' strange
fecklessness that will naturally be seen as the cause. Hart and Honor6's
second specific principle is that, where highly voluntary human actions are
among the antecedent conditions relevant to a given result, these will have a
special claim to be considered causes. Thus, if someone knows that a
hurricane is on the way, and deliberately weakens the bracing of his
neighbor's roof, it is his voluntary intervention rather than the hurricane that
will be considered the cause if the roof collapses.
Hart and Honor6 very usefully emphasize that a characteristic feature of
causal inquiry in law and history may be obscured if the application of either
of these principles is represented as simply the selection of appropriate
conditions from a temporally antecedent, jointly sufficient set.8 When
searching for the cause of an occurrence, an investigator often faces the
problem of how far back he needs to go along a series of conditions, each of
which is sufficient for the next. In the example where the neighbor
deliberately weakened the roof, a set of conditions sufficient for what
happened which included the roof's weakened state presumably existed just
prior to the roof's collapse. But it would be natural in many contexts for
someone looking for the cause of the collapse to look right through any such
4. J.S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 237-41 (8th ed. 1890).
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set of conditions to the action of the person who weakened the roof, since this
satisfies our paradigm notion of a cause. Therefore, according to Hart and
Honor6, abnormal conditions and voluntary actions tend to function as
temporal termini in causal inquiry. They are something back to which we are
generally prepared to trace causal series, and back through which we are
reluctant to do so. Although Hart and Honor6 only consider examples drawn
from everyday life and from the law, their analysis also throws a good deal of
light on causal controversies in history, notably those in which the issue is
whether the causes of something like a war or revolution were long-term or
short-term.
III
Sometimes when we ask about the cause of an occurrence, Hart and
Honor6 observe, it is because we do not understand why it happened. 9 In the
case of a plane crash, for example, it may be only during a subsequent
investigation that it is discovered that the craft was struck by lightning or had
some serious mechanical fault. The investigator may thus find a causally
selectable factor in a set of conditions close in time to the result.
Alternatively, he may trace the cause back to the negligence of someone in the
ground maintenance staff who failed to correct the fault, a condition that, as
Hart and Honor6 put it, offers us a fuller or more satisfactory explanation.
But in still other cases, the causal question is raised when there is no question
about what took place. This is typically the case when the relevant antecedent
conditions include more than one that exhibits the kind of feature that leads
to its selection as a cause. The question then is whether the claim of one of
these conditions to causal status can be sustained in the light of the claim of
the other. For example, in the case of the plane crash, it may be known from
the outset that there was a procedure the pilot could have used to correct the
mechanical fault, and that he did not use it. But it may be unknown whether
the circumstances of his omission were such that the eventual crash should be
attributed to this pilot error, rather than the more remote negligence of the
mechanic. It is natural to say that the aim of the inquiry in such circumstances
is less to explain than to attribute responsibility for what occurred.
Consequently, it is natural to begin talking of two sorts of causal judgment,
explanatory and attributive. Lawyers, and to a lesser degree historians, are
especially concerned to make judgments of the latter sort.
But if this example offers a fair illustration of the distinction that Hart and
Honor6 want to note, it is important to see that, in one important sense, there
is no discoverable contrast here between different sorts of causal judgment. In
both explanatory and attributive cases, the criteria for selecting the specific
causal condition are the same. In the explanatory inquiry, the failure of the
mechanic would presumably be selected as the cause because, unlike the sheer
physical abnormality of the mechanical fault, this was an abnormal exercise of
9. Id. at 22.
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free human agency. In other words, on the criteria of abnormality and
voluntariness, this is the point to which, but not through which, we trace the
causal series in search of a satisfactory causal explanation. This may not be done in
the attributive context envisaged because of our knowledge of the later
human intervention-the pilot's failure to take appropriate remedial action.
But if the pilot's error is causal enough in the attributive case to justify not
looking back to still more remote conditions, it is surely causal enough to
justify not doing so where the concern is not to attribute but to explain. In
other words, if after an explanatory inquiry has resulted in the judgment that
the cause of the crash was the mechanic's negligence, a later attributive
inquiry concludes instead that it was the failure of the pilot, the different
results will not be a consequence of appropriately different kinds of causal
reasoning in the two cases. It will be a consequence of a mistake in causal
reasoning in at least one case. If the conclusion in the attributive case is
sound, this will require a revision of the original causal explanation. There are
simply no resources in Hart and Honor&'s theory for distinguishing causal
judgments according to whether the interest or ultimate aim of the
investigator is explanatory or attributive.
Hart and Honor& could be interpreted to suggest otherwise. For example,
in illustrating the special interest of an explanatory inquiry, they sometimes
slip into talking about the need to discover first how the result came about
before raising attributive questions, as if an explanatory inquiry is concerned
only with identifying all the relevant conditions before facing the question of
which condition to regard as the cause for attributive purposes.' 0 But they
talk just as often about explanatory inquiry seeking to discover why a result
occurred, and they do this in contexts where it is clear that what they have in
mind is not simply a noncausally selective answer to a why question, but a
causally selective one.I From the very beginning, they represent explanatory
inquiries as searching out conditions which are properly selected as causes.
And their idea of an attributive inquiry does not introduce any selective
principle not already adumbrated for such causally explanatory ones.
IV
Does the reiterated association of the idea of an attributive inquiry with
that of assigning responsibility suggest a principle for selecting causes? Is the
move from explanatory to attributive contexts a move from purely factual to
evaluative, and even moralistic concerns? Hart and Honor& do say that
lawyers and historians need not become "moralists" in either context of
inquiry.-'2 This seems to mean only that to select a person or his action as the
cause of some harmful result is not identical to judging him blameworthy.
People are not always blamed for what they cause, nor are they always the
cause of that for which they are properly held responsible. As Hart and
10. Id. at 22.
11. Id. at 32, 34, 37.
12. Id. at 59, 73.
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Honor6 apply the criteria of abnormality and voluntariness in explanatory and
attributive cases, they are far from value free. There is little hope of basing a
firm distinction between the two kinds of inquiry on the presence or absence,
or even the relative presence or absence, of value judgments in them.
In the contexts Hart and Honor6 have in mind, value judgments enter into
judgments of abnormality because to judge something abnormal requires the
selection of a standard of comparison; and there may be no value-free way of
showing that a certain standard is the one that ought to be employed in a
particular case.' 3 They underline this fact without explicitly drawing the
conclusion. To use one of their own examples,' 4 if a famine occurs in an
underdeveloped country, a local peasant may quite naturally see it as caused
by a drought that year, since with the rainfall that usually accrues, crops are
adequate. While not denying the indispensable role of the drought, officials
of the World Food Authority may look right through this condition to find the
cause of the famine in the government's failure to accumulate food reserves.
This result is more likely if it is well-known that drought occurs in the region
from time to time. The standard by which the peasant identifies the relevant
abnormality is the ordinary course of nature as he experiences it. The
standard employed by the Authority is what governments do (or even what
they ought to do) in circumstances where drought happens often enough to
require preventive measures. In fact, value judgment enters into the selection
of causal conditions here in two ways. The peasant evidently expects little
from his government; given what he knows of it, he sees its omission as
perfectly normal. But the Authority will not let the government off so easily.
It will not accept the past behavior of a particular government as an
appropriate standard of comparison in this case. It will insist on contrasting
the omission in question with what would generally be done by governments
with comparable responsibilities and powers. The Authority's standard is
thus more demanding morally than that of the peasant. Value judgment also
enters in when the Authority treats the drought as normal even though the
peasant treats it as abnormal. In the Authority's view, it is normal in the sense
that it occurs frequently enough to impose obligations on those who are in a
position to prevent it.
Because Hart and Honor6 frequently observe, without offering any
evidence, that the features of causal thinking in everyday life and in the law
that especially interest them are found also in the causal thinking of
historians,' 5 it is interesting to note a parallel to the case just examined in a
controversy over the causes of World War II between two English historians,
A.J.P. Taylor and H.R. Trevor-Roper.I1 In a provocative book,' 7 Taylor
denies what he calls the traditional view that Hitler's prewar policies aimed at
13. Id. at 33.
14. Id. at 33.
15. Id. at 2, 8, 10, 21.
16. This controversy was discussed in W. DRAY, PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORN' 69-96 (1980).
17. A.J.P. TAYLOR, i'IIE ORIGINS OF TIlE SECOND WORLD WAR (1961).
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German aggrandizement caused the war. He contends that, although these
policies were aggressive, they were perfectly normal for a country that was
potentially the greatest power in Europe. What was abnormal, and the real
cause of the war, was the failure of the other powers either to keep Germany
weak when they could have done so or to facilitate her regaining her "natural
weight" in the power system. Trevor-Roper objects that Hitler's policies were
in fact far more aggressive than those of his predecessors and were
inconsistent with the means available in the post-Versailles world for settling
international disputes.18 Taylor's standard of comparison for judging the
normality of Hitler's policies is based on several hundred years of European
great power history, which he sums up in the slogan "powers will be powers."
Trevor-Roper's standard is based on a considerably foreshortened period in
which he sees higher norms of international behavior. This difference
between standards of comparison in effect expresses a difference between
cynicism and idealism about world politics: it is a difference in value
judgments.
It is even easier to see the way Hart and Honor6's second criterion,
voluntariness, involves causal inquiry in value judgments. As these authors
point out, the notion of a fully voluntary action is not univocal: it is the notion
of an action that is not defective in any one of a number of ways. 19 First, and
least problematically, an action is not voluntary if the agent lacks adequate
bodily control or the means of expressing his will. It is also, and more
interestingly, not voluntary when done in response to a threat, when the
action is coerced, or done under pressing obligation, when the action is a
matter of duty, or is the one real choice in a difficult situation. But to decide
whether an action was in fact coerced, it is necessary to judge to what extent
an alleged threat justified the agent's conclusion that he had to act as he did;
and this requires an estimate of the importance of the interests threatened. If
an action is more likely to be viewed as involuntary when a gun is pulled than
when the "threat" consists of the promise of a frown, this difference surely
has a moral basis. Similarly, whether an agent was in fact obliged to do what
he did is a question that requires a judgment of the validity of the alleged
obligation. For example, the driver of a borrowed car is not obliged to run
over a pedestrian who gets in his way in the middle of a block because he
promised the car's owner to use the brakes only at major intersections.
Whether an agent had only one real choice is even more overtly a value-
charged matter. For Hart and Honor6, in an attributive context the problem
is whether the intervention of a second agent was voluntary enough to
"negative" the causal connection between the action of a defendant and a
certain harmful result to which he has contributed a necessary condition. 20
But this will require a value judgment in assessing the voluntariness of the
second agent's action. The same will be true, however, in explanatory
18. Trevor-Roper, A.J.P. Taylo, Hiller and the WIar, ENCOUNTER, July 1961, at 88.
19. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORf, supra note 1, at 129-5 1.
20. Id. at 128.
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contexts if the relative voluntariness of a contributory action becomes an
issue.
A good example of the way this works in history can be seen in an
explanation of the outbreak of the Mexican War in 1846 recently offered by
the American historian, N.A. Graebner. 21 The cause, Graebner argues, was
the impatience of too many American citizens, and of President Polk in
particular, to realize long-cherished territorial ambitions at the expense of
Mexico. 22 Although he concedes that the Mexicans were obstreperous, were
unwilling to negotiate even genuine American grievances, and were prone to
move their troops provocatively along the ill-defined border between the two
countries, Graebner refuses to find any part of the war's cause on the Meiican
side.2 3 He supports this refusal with the following argument. A strong power
in conflict with a weaker typically gives the weaker only two choices: to fight
or to capitulate. Since capitulation was unthinkable for reasons of national
honor, which Graebner appears to find cogent, Mexico in fact had only one
real choice. 24 By contrast, the stronger power had three choices: to increase
the pressure, to moderate demands, or to let things drift. 2 5 This argument
suggests that the Americans had freedom of action while the Mexicans were
forced or obliged to do what they did. 26 This is a clear instance of the
operation of the voluntariness criterion of causal selection and the role of
value judgment in its application.
V
If explanatory and attributive causal inquiries cannot be distinguished by
saying that value judgment is involved in one and not the other, might it
nevertheless be said that the second alone is moralistic in the sense of issuing
in an explicit attribution of responsibility? This could be said only with
important qualifications. For one thing, the expression "was responsible for"
is sometimes used in asserting causal connection in explanatory contexts as
well. Even in attributive contexts, the moral implications may thin out to the
vanishing point where not only human actions but also natural events are said
to be responsible for a given result. Indeed, as Hart and Honor6 themselves
put it, the attributive problem in legal contexts is frequently whether a certain
harm can be attributed to an earlier action, in spite of a later intervention, or
an abnormal conjunction of events and circumstances. 27 In other words, the
question is whether to attribute the harm to a person or to a thing.
Occasionally, our authors advise us to bear in mind that "was responsible
for" has more than one meaning.2 8 For example, it sometimes means no
21. Graebner, The Mexican War: A Study in Causation, 49 PAc. HIST. REv. 405 (1980).
22. Id. at 422.
23. Id. at 408.
24. Id. at 407.
25. Id. at 420.
26. Id. at 407.
27. H.L.A. HART & A. HONOR , supra note 1, at 23.
28. Id. at 61.
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more than "was the cause of," in which case it is tempting to assume it is used
nonattributively. 29 At other times, even in Hart and Honor6's own discussion,
its meaning extends as far as "was to blame for."30 In both law and morals,
however, we seem to need a sense that stops short of this-a sense which
allows us to say that it is only with reference to what a person was responsible
for that he ought either to be praised or blamed. In attributive contexts, the
responsibility ascribed to persons falls short of praise or blame in this way,
while asserting more than could be causally asserted of natural events. It is
something like "answerability," or, in legal contexts, perhaps "liability." 3 1
Yet it is of little help in analyzing the nature of the causal judgments made in
attributive contexts to note that responsibility is ascribed in this sense, for
causal judgment does not itself assert such responsibility. The reason why the
judgment should be regarded as "attributive" thus remains obscure.
This problem is brought into sharper focus, without being solved, by Hart
and Honor6's attack on the doctrine ascribed to "legal modernists" that the
only so-called "factual" element in causal judgment is the certification of
causes as conditions sine qua non. 32 Associated with this doctrine, the
authors assert, is the claim that designating the acts of one person as the cause
of a result rather than the acts of another is simply the application of different
assessments of their responsibility for the result. 3 3 The "legal modernists"
would refer to this application as simply a matter of "policy."
Hart and Honor& respond that to say that a person caused a given result is
not to hold him responsible for it, but to give a reason for doing so. Because
such a reason is not in itself a sufficient one, the judgments of causation and
of responsibility will not always coincide.3 4 An example of this distinction is
provided by a person in New York City who negligently lights a fire in his
house which spreads to a neighbor's house and then down an adjoining row. 35
The applicable law in this jurisdiction specifies that the incendiary is
responsible only for damage done to the first of the additional houses
affected. Although legal policy may cut off responsibility at a certain point,
however, Hart and Honor& insist that it cannot similarly cut off causation.3 6
This means that an incendiary who is relieved of responsibility for the more
remote damage may still have caused it, given the criteria ordinarily applied in
causal judgment.
Of course, what Hart and Honor&, following the "legal modernists," call a
"factual element" in causal judgment is somewhat less factual than this
language may lead one to expect. For example, in raising the strictly causal
29. Id.
30. Id. at 60, 93-94.
31. See id. at 61.
32. See id. at 269-71.
33. Id. at 270.
34. Id. at 60-62.
35. Id. at 63, 84. Hart and Honor6 base this example on Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y.
210 (1866).
36. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 1, at 85, 87.
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question, it will be relevant to ask whether some of the neighbors helped
spread the fire, thus intervening in a causally relevant way. As we have seen,
the question whether such interventions are voluntary or abnormal enough to
sever the connection to further consequences may involve value
considerations. However, the inquirer is not required to decide who was
responsible for what occurred before reaching a causal conclusion, deriving
therefrom a criterion of selection for the causal judgment itself.
VI
Is there no fundamental difference, then, between explanatory and
attributive causal inquiries, or at any rate, none possessing the kind of
theoretical importance that seemed promised by the word "attributive" and
the close association of attributive inquiry with the idea of assigning
responsibility? Inquiries which begin by being puzzled about what occurred
can certainly be distinguished from those which are understood well enough
before a cause is specified, calling the first sort explanatory, but only the
second causally explanatory. A distinction also can be drawn between
inquiries in which the condition that is eventually called the cause is not
known, or not known to be relevant, at the outset, and those in which both its
existence and its relevance are already known, although its causal status is not
yet known. Inquiries which respond to the question "What caused this
harm?" or even "How far back must we go to find the cause of this harm?"
can be distinguished from those which respond to the still more complex
question "Given a later action or set of circumstances, can this harm be said to
have been caused by that still earlier event or condition?" And a distinction
can be made between inquiries in which the goal is simply causal explanation
and those whose ultimate purpose is to find out who or what was responsible
for what was caused. None of these contrasts, however, offer any secure basis
for distinguishing between two kinds of causal inquiry, causal judgment, or
concepts of causal connection, one to be called explanatory and the other
attributive.
There remains one possibility that is worth exploring. Hart and Honor
point out that in attributive contexts, the question is often, and even typically,
framed not in the language of causes, but in the language of consequences.3 7
This is of significance for our problem because, as they show at a number of
points, causal statements and corresponding consequence statements are not
always interchangeable. Hart and Honor6 give the example of the failure of a
contractor to take appropriate measures against flooding, permitting an
inundation of a plaintiff's property to continue longer than it needed to with
consequently greater damage.38 It was concluded here that, although the
damage was a consequence of the contractor's negligence, it could not plausibly
be said that the latter was the cause of it: that was to be found in certain
37. Id. at 59-60.
38. Id. at 132-33.
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"forces of nature." In considering such examples, Hart and Honor6
sometimes contrast actually causing harm with merely occasioning it, the latter
including cases where an agent merely allows something to happen or be
done.39 In an explanatory inquiry, the question is always whether a certain
action or some other condition actually caused the result, where this is taken to
mean more than merely occasioning it. If the question in an attributive
inquiry is always whether a result can be said to be the consequence of an
antecedent action, and this can include its merely being occasioned by it,
then, since the consequence relation incorporates more than the strictly
causal one, the two sorts of inquiry become distinguishable on a
comprehensible and applicable criterion.
This way of resolving the problem, however, would be highly prescriptive,
given Hart and Honor6's own demonstration that consequence language is
naturally used in explanatory contexts and that the full-blown language of
cause is used in attributive contexts. 40 For example, where someone was
knifed and shot at approximately the same time, the question might arise, in
an explanatory context, whether the ensuing death was due to the knifing or
to the shooting. In a discussion of the causal significance of providing
opportunities to act, Hart and Honor6 themselves present a case where
merely allowing harm is described as causing it.41 When a householder goes
away, leaving his house in the care of a neighbor who negligently fails to lock
the door one night, and a thief seizes the opportunity to steal the silverware,
the cause of the loss, they quite plausibly say, was the neighbor's unfortunate
omission. The causal reasoning here seems identical with what is later
referred to as occasioning. The person whose omission is selected as the
cause had certain responsibilities in the context envisaged and the harm he
was supposed to prevent was normal enough to be commonly guarded
against. Thus, although it may be true that it feels especially comfortable to
use the language of consequences when ascribing responsibility, it would be
sheer stipulation to make its use the identifying mark of attributive inquiry.
In conclusion, therefore, there is no such thing as attributive causal
judgment or an attributive concept of causal connection; and if there is anything
that can properly be called attributive causal inquiry, this seems to be so only
in the sense that a causal inquiry of an explanatory sort may be pursued from
the outset with a view to eventually raising the question of responsibility.
39. Seeid. at 179-87.
40. Id. at 61-62.
41. Id. at 55-56.
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